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When Hegel speaks about the family, he has a very specific form of family life in mind. We call that the petty bourgeois family. In our time we can no longer consider the family essential as an economic entity, nor the larger community of blood relatives. The organization of economic life has limited the various functions that the family can fulfil…
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508 But though the good is the universal of will - a universal determined in itself - and thus including in it particularity - still so far as this particularity is in the first instance still abstract, there is no principle at hand to determine it. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal; and as heteronomy or determinanc…
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507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal, essential and actual, will - the law and underlying essence of every phase of volition, the essential and actual good. It is thus the absolute final aim of the world, and duty for the agent who ought to have insight into the good, make …
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A fascinating topic: what are the ordinary presuppositions of our moral life? And what are the limitations or illusions of those presuppositions? Hegel's analysis shows clearly that we find it self evident that we are only responsible for our actions, in so far as our intentions go. There are however unforeseen consequences of our actions. So how d…
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# 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective will. The 'reality' of right, which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise, is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjective will − whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential right, so may on the other cu…
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# 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () that a particular will, that of the judge, being conformable to the right, has an interest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance, in revenge, is a matter of chance), and () that an executive power (also in the first instance casual) negates the negation …
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¤ 500 As a violation of right, such an action is essentially and actually null. In it the agent, as a volitional and intelligent being, sets up a law − a law, however, which is formal and recognized by him only − a universal which has validity for him, and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. To display the nullity of…
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Analysis of three paragraphs in section c. Right vs. Wrong, in Hegel's Encyclopedia. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right, still presumed identical with the several titles, is affirmed, willed, and recognized, the only diversity lies in this, that the special thing is subsumed under the one law or right by t…
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495 The contract, as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity, involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right), and, in that case, produces a wrong: by which, however, the absolute law (right) is not superseded, but only…
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¤ 488 Mind, in the immediacy of its self?secured liberty, is an individual, but one that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person, in whom the inward sense of this freedom, as in itself still abstract and empty, has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part, but on an external thing. This thing, as something…
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Discussion of Par 44 gets us to the great question why it is property that defines our freedom. Par. 44 explains the entitlement to acquire property, where property is the ownership of natural things that have no self-consciousness nor free will. The absolute chasm between subjective freedom and objective, natural things is also a contradiction., T…
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What is a "person"? Not in a psychological, but in a philosophical sense. Hegel uses that word to express the existing free wil, the subject of freedom and liberty. But a "person" is in his language just an abstract individual. And just as abstract is the main category of personality: property. In Hegel's text there is a discussion going on with th…
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Free will by its nature strives to become real, that is realized not only by achieving what it wants, but to create a world in which this freedom is secured and mweaningfull. This, to Hegel, is the basis drive that produces our organized, modern society. It's institutions safeguard freedom as much as it (seems to) limit them.…
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We're talking about Enc. 483, that deals with the transition from the free will in the philosophical psychology to the Philosophy of Right proper, dealing with ownership. See www.hegelcourses.wordpress.com for further material on this issue.Also you can join me on Facebook on my Hegelcourses page:https://www.facebook.com/Hegelcourses/…
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